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ABSTRACT 
Several leading mainstream economists including Gary Becker have treated habit as serially 
correlated behaviour resulting from deliberate choices. This approach puts choice before habit 
but involves assumptions of extensive memory and decision-making capacity. By contrast, 
earlier authors such as William James, John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen saw deliberation 
and choice as a contingent outcome of habits, where the latter are defined in terms of acquired 
dispositions rather than overt behaviour. The approach of this second group is more consistent 
with an evolutionary perspective and the limited computational capacities of the human brain. 
 
 
 
 
In some way or another, it is widely accepted that habits affect our choices, and past choices 
affect habits.1 Beyond this consensus, however, there is dispute whether habit or choice are 
ultimately in the driving seat. For most economists, decision and choice have been uppermost 
and habit has followed in its wake. After all, economics since Lionel Robbins (1932) has been 
dubbed „the science of choice‟. 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee and participants at an Erfurt workshop on „Automaticity in 
Judgement and Decision Making‟, 28 February – 1 March 2008, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
 - 1 - 
Choice is made supreme even in the works of economists who apparently embrace a 
concept of habit. Notably Gary Becker (1992) assumes a meta-preference function which is 
revealed to the agent through experience, and is apparently consistent with behavioural 
„habits‟ and „addictions‟ (Becker and Murphy 1988). The (meta-) preference function – 
supposedly a representation of the mechanism of choice – remains sovereign, and the claimed 
achievement is to accommodate even addictions or habitual behaviour in a rational choice 
model.2 
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the idea that choice and decision have universal 
and ultimate sway over habit. It is argued by contrast that the prioritisation of choice faces the 
same problem of causal explanation of the origin of choice itself, both in the evolution of the 
human species and the development of a single individual. Sometimes economists seem like 
ungodly creationists who locate the unexplained origin of the capacity for choice in the 
individual, rather than God. As conventional creationists fail to explain the origins of God, 
conventional economists provide no evolutionary explanation of the origin of individual 
choice. 
The corrosive effect of Darwinism on notions of supreme choice or deliberation was 
recognised by Darwin himself. Darwin wrote in 1856 in his notebooks: „Men are called 
“creatures of reason,” more appropriately they would be “creatures of habit”‟ (Darwin 1974, 
pp. 84, 115). The implications of Darwin‟s argument were developed by the psychologist and 
philosopher William James, and both in turn influenced John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen. 
Dewey (1894, pp. 338-9) responded to the proposition of an uncaused ego with the insistence 
that „it becomes necessary to find a cause for this preference of one alternative over the other.‟ 
The causes of the causing ego have also to be explained. 
Taking up this scientific imperative of universal causal explanation, this essay upholds that 
reason, deliberation and choice have evolved in humans on a bedrock of habits and instincts, 
which in turn have a much longer evolutionary history. Furthermore, for each individual, the 
capacity for deliberation and choice depends on habits and instincts, inherited respectively 
through our culture and our biology. Moreover, there is evidence that acts of deliberation are 
preceded by unconscious brain processes; these signify that our minds are disposed towards 
the choice outcome before we are aware of our decision, and show that conscious deliberation 
does not have temporal priority over associated, unconscious mental dispositions. 
The consequences of this (essentially Darwinian) line of argument were well understood by 
James, Dewey, Veblen and others over one hundred years ago. But they were neglected in the 
social sciences from the 1920s until the 1990s. With the revival of a Darwinian impetus in the 
social sciences and psychology, they are enjoying a renewed appreciation by philosophers and 
social theorists today. 
Before establishing its key propositions concerning the evolutionary and developmental 
prioritisation of instinct, habit, deliberation and choice, this paper discusses the nature and 
roles of habits and instincts, and how they relate to one another. After its core argument is 
completed, I consider some of the implications for economics and the social sciences. 
                                                 
2 In contrast, in a early paper Becker (1962) regarded rationality and habit as rival but similarly competent 
explanations of economic phenomena: habit was not explained in terms of rationality. After his meta-preference 
function appeared in later writings its intended ontological status remained unclear. Becker might follow Milton 
Friedman (1953) in proposing that the only scientific test of such a function is whether it makes „correct 
predictions‟. This leaves unanswered the vital question of what viable neural and psychological mechanisms 
actually underlie preferences or choice.  
 - 2 - 
What are instincts? 
Purged from the Anglophone social sciences in the interwar years, the concept of instinct has 
now returned (Degler, 1991). Of course, many important details remain controversial, even 
beyond the familiar question of the relative importance of nature and nurture. But much of 
this can be avoided if we use the term broadly to describe any biologically inherited reflex, 
feeling or disposition that can be triggered by specific cues. Instincts are not fixed behaviours; 
they are dispositions that can often be suppressed or diverted. It is fully acknowledged that the 
expressions of these feelings or dispositions depend on the social context, including culture. 
Crucially, these dispositions can be diminished or suppressed by cultural and other conditions. 
There is clear evidence for some human instincts. There are instinctive reflexes to clutch, 
suckle, and much else. In particular, after Noam Chomsky (1959) doubted the behaviourist 
view that language could develop simply through stimulus and response, it has been 
conclusively demonstrated that language cannot be learned simply through interaction with 
the environment. Newborn babies inherit the means of recognition and imitation of some 
vocal sounds, as well as some elemental understanding of linguistic structure (Pinker, 1994). 
Although the development of language is impossible without extensive social interaction, it is 
also impossible without priming instincts. 
Instincts are aroused by circumstances and specific sensory inputs. Particular circumstances 
can trigger inherited instincts such as fear, imitation or sexual arousal. It is beyond the point 
to argue that acquired habit or socialization are much more important than instinct. Many of 
our dispositions and much of our personality are formed after birth. But the importance of 
socialization does not deny the necessary role of instinct. Both instinct and habit are vital for 
individual development. Inherited dispositions are necessary for socialization to begin its 
work. Obversely, much instinct cannot manifest itself without the help of culture and 
socialization. Instinctive behaviour and socialization are not always rivals but often 
complements: they interact with one another. The degree to which we are affected by our 
social circumstances is immense, but that is no ground for the banishment of the concept of 
instinct from social theory. 
Some social scientists declare that instincts cannot by definition be overridden. They then 
produce evidence that claimed instincts can be diverted or blocked by culture, and then 
conclude that instincts are irrelevant for the social sciences (e.g. Robertson 1978). The flaw in 
this argument lies in its definitional premise. Instincts require contextual triggers to become 
operative, and they can be diverted or blocked. We understand human behaviour party 
through the interplay of (inherited) instincts and (acquired) habits. Instincts alone cannot 
explain outcomes. 
Definitions of Habit 
Unlike instinct, a habit is a propensity that is moulded by environmental circumstances and 
transmitted culturally rather than biologically. For James, Veblen and Dewey, habit was a 
propensity or disposition. It did not mean behaviour as such. James (1893, p. 143) 
proclaimed: „Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent.‟ Veblen (1898, p. 390) wrote of „a coherent structure of propensities and habits which 
seeks realisation and expression in an unfolding activity‟. As John Dewey (1922, p. 42) put it: 
„The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response.‟ 
The mechanisms of habit are largely unconscious, but they may press on our awareness. 
Habits are submerged repertoires of potential behaviour; they can be triggered or reinforced 
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by an appropriate stimulus or context. The meaning of habit adopted by the pragmatist 
philosophers and instinct psychologists was of an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may 
or may not be actually expressed in current behaviour. A similar interpretation of habit as a 
disposition is found in the work of contemporary psychologists (Ouellette and Wood 1998, 
Wood et al. 2002, Wood and Neal 2007). 
Brain imaging studies on human subjects (Poldrack et al., 2001) show that the formation of 
habits involves a shift away from parts of the brain associated with conscious, declarative 
memory and goal-setting (the medial temporal lobe and pre-frontal cortex) towards areas 
associated with procedural memory and context-triggered responses (the basal ganglia). 
Repeated behaviour is important in establishing a habit. But if we acquire a habit we do not 
necessarily use it all the time. It is a propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular 
class of situations. 
This conception of habit contrasts with that used by some other authors. For example, Gary 
Becker (1992, p. 328) wrote: „I define habitual behavior as displaying a positive relation 
between past and current consumption‟. Becker here defines habit not as a behavioural 
propensity but as sequentially correlated behaviour. In contrast, the view of habit here is of a 
disposition, which, once acquired, is not necessarily realised in any future behaviour. Habit is 
a causal mechanism, not a set of correlated events. 
Habit and scarce computational capacity 
Becker‟s behaviourist (non-dispositional) definition of habit allows him to argue that habit (as 
behaviour) is always based upon and derived from rational choice. By contrast, a habit (as a 
disposition) cannot be so readily and universally explained in this way. While the formation 
of habits depends upon behaviour, and much behaviour is the consequence of choice, it is not 
all so. Behaviour can also be impelled by instincts and through non-deliberative channels. 
Another problem with Becker‟s argument, where habit is a possible outcome of a meta-
preference function, is the computational and information requirements implied by the 
process of learning from new experiences.3 Becker argues that every piece of information is 
taken into account. This implies that the brain must somehow store and retain information 
from all sensory inputs, at every instant of time. Clearly the amount of information involved 
would be enormous and increasing rapidly through time; it would quickly exceed the storage 
capacity of human memory. 
In terms of energy requirements, the brain is very expensive. While it accounts for less than 
two per cent of our weight, it consumes up to twenty per cent of our calorific intake (Drubach 
2000). The larger the brain, the more energy required. The evolution of the human brain was a 
trade-off between its survival advantages and its energy costs. 
Becker‟s idea of a meta-preference function that accommodates all relevant information 
ignores these energy costs and this vital evolutionary trade-off. Despite Becker‟s (1976) 
                                                 
3 Of course, limited human computational capacity was a key issue raised by Herbert Simon (1957). Ironically, 
despite their overall focus on the concept of scarcity, neoclassical economists are led by their stress on rationality 
to overlook scarce mental capacities. For a long while, the adoption of Robbin‟s (1932) strictures and 
Friedman‟s (1953) „as if‟ methodology diverted economists from consideration of the neural and psychological 
realities underpinning preferences. Fortunately, economists are now paying more attention to psychology (Rabin 
1998). 
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enduring interest in some important evolutionary themes, I have found no discussion in his 
work of the energy and other costs of storing and processing information in the brain. Instead, 
even when directly addressing the evolutionary context, Becker and his colleagues consider 
problems such as the solution to an ‘optimal incentive problem’ in terms of a ‘happiness 
function … based on a context-dependent reference point’ that ‘aggregates all information 
available towards assessing the individual’s current performance’ (Rayo and Becker 2007, p. 
304). 
In contrast to an imaginary brain that amasses „all information‟ received, habit (in the sense 
of an acquired disposition) is a much cruder way of storing information from past experience. 
But it vastly economises on brain storage capacity. Habit crudely encapsulates past adaptive 
behaviour, and does not mean that every piece of information is retained. 
The role of habit is illustrated by an agent-based simulation developed by Thorbjørn 
Knudsen and myself (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). The simulation considers the evolution 
of a traffic convention, concerning whether to drive on the left or right side of a circular track. 
Agents make decisions through weighted combinations of „rational deliberation‟ on current 
information and habitual dispositions to drive on one side rather than the other. The most 
important result of these simulations concerns the effect of introducing processes of 
habituation into the modelling of agent behaviour. In most of parameter space, strength of 
habit can increase the systemic rate of convergence towards a left/right convention. In some 
circumstances it can also enhance systemic resistance to error. In short, habit helps agents to 
deal with uncertainty, complexity and change. But it requires relatively limited mental storage 
capacity. 
For Becker and others, the origins of choice or rationality remain to be explained. By 
reversing the primacy, and installing habit as the foundation of deliberation and choice, we 
have the beginnings of an explanation consistent with the facts of human evolution. In turn, 
habit is placed on a foundation of inherited instinct, as mentioned further below. 
These moves are resisted by many social scientists because of a reluctance to remove 
choice, reason or belief from the driving seat of human action. If habits affect behaviour then 
it is wrongly feared that reason and belief will be dethroned. The concern is that volition 
would be replaced by mechanism. However, reasons and beliefs themselves depend upon 
habits of thought. Habits act as necessary filters of experience and the foundations of intuition 
and interpretation. They are the grounding of both reflective and non-reflective behaviour. 
This does not make belief, reason or will any less important or real. 
Instincts, habits, deliberation and evolution 
From the perspective of pragmatist philosophy, Jamesian psychology and Veblenian 
institutional economics (Hodgson, 2004), habits are vital to all thought and behaviour. All 
deliberations, including rational optimisation, themselves rely on habits and rules (Hodgson 
1997, Vanberg 2002, 2004). In that habits are triggered by circumstances or stimuli, they have 
a conditional or rule-like structure. Even rational optimisation, if and when possible, must 
involve rules. In turn, as suggested above, rules have to become ingrained in habits in order to 
be deployed by agents. Hence rational deliberation always depends on prior habits and rules 
as props (Hodgson, 1988). The view of Becker (1992) and others that rational choices can 
lead to the formation of habits is valid. But what is also being proposed here is that rational 
choices themselves are always and necessarily reliant on prior habits. 
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Instinct is prior to habit, habit is prior to belief, and belief is prior to reason. That is the 
order in which they have evolved in our human ancestry over millions of years. That too is the 
order in which they appear in the ontogenetic development of each human individual. The 
capacity for belief and reason develops on a foundation of acquired instinctive and habitual 
dispositions. That too is the order in which they are arranged in a hierarchy of functional 
dependence, where the current operation of reason depends upon belief, belief depends upon 
habit, and habit depends upon instinct. Lower elements in the hierarchy do not entirely 
determine the higher functions, but they impel them into being, where they are formed in their 
respective natural and social context. The lower elements are necessary but not sufficient for 
the higher (Margolis, 1987; Murphy, 1994, Hodgson 2006b). 
For Darwinian psychologists such as James, human agents possess instincts, habits and 
deliberative capacities. Our capacity to reason and appraise outcomes exceeds other 
organisms by far, but nevertheless depends upon the substrata of inherited and acquired 
dispositions. Darwinism embraces a „doctrine of continuity‟ (Huxley, 1894, vol. 1, pp. 236-7) 
where consciousness and deliberation do not suddenly appear in the evolution of organisms. 
Hence Darwinism does not deny human intentionality but places it in an evolutionary context. 
Darwin (1859, p. 208) thus wrote in the Origin of Species: „A little dose … of judgement or 
reason often comes into play, even in animals very low in the scale of nature‟. Darwin (1871, 
vol. 1, p. 46) restated the idea in The Descent of Man: „animals possess some power of 
reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate and resolve‟. 
Darwinism recognizes that human reason can neither appear nor function without inherited 
or learned dispositional supports. Just as earlier organisms have a smidgeon of reason, human 
rational capacities are built on subconscious mechanisms inherited from our pre-human 
ancestors. We thus retain instincts and unconscious mental processes that can function 
independently of our conscious reasoning. As some animal species developed more complex 
instincts, they eventually acquired the capacity to register fortuitous and reinforced 
behaviours through the evolution of mechanisms of habituation. In turn, upon these 
mechanisms, humans built culture and language. Our layered mind, with its unconscious 
lower strata, maps our long evolution from less deliberative organisms. Consistent with the 
evolutionary doctrine of continuity, habits and instincts are highly functional evolutionary 
survivals of our pre-human past. 
When the human species evolved its capacity to reason, it dependence on instinct and habit 
did not decline. Darwin (1871, vol. 1, p. 37) wrote: „Cuvier maintained that instinct and 
intelligence stand in an inverse ratio to each other; and some have thought that the intellectual 
facilities of the higher animals have been gradually developed from their instincts. But … no 
such inverse ratio really exists.‟ As noted below, some influential social theorists took the 
contrary view that intelligence and instinct preclude one another. 
The evolutionary survival of habits in the human species 
Both instincts and habits are important. But we need to explain why efficacious habits do not 
eventually get encoded in instincts after thousands of years, and further economise on the use 
of brain capacity. Instincts encode dispositions without the need for imitation and neural 
learning. We have to explain why behavioural propensities that enhance survival value are 
habitual rather than instinctive; we must explain why they are learned anew for each 
individual, rather than simply biologically inherited. 
Humans have faced the problems of costly information search for hundreds of thousands of 
years. So we may ask: what is to stop natural selection eventually creating sophisticatedly 
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programmed instincts that are sufficiently flexible to deal with most circumstances, and 
reduce the cost of searching for information? Cultural transmission, with its frequent mistakes 
of learning and imitation, is much more subject to error than the more conservative genetic 
inheritance system. If evolved instincts are more reliable and much less error prone, why did 
they not eventually provide the complete apparatus of human cognition and action?  
Remarkably, Veblen addressed these issues long ago. Veblen (1914, p. 6) argued that 
instincts on their own were too blunt or vague as instruments to deal with the more rapidly 
evolving exigencies of the human condition. Habits, being more adaptable than instincts, are 
necessary to deal with „the larger body of knowledge in any given community‟ and the 
„elaborate … ways and means interposed between these impulses and their realisation‟. With 
intelligent organisms dealing with complex circumstances, instincts remain vital, but the 
modificatory power of habits becomes relatively more important. The social and natural 
environment is too inconstant to allow the natural selection of sufficiently complex and 
refined instincts to take place. Habits are acquired, additional and necessary means for 
instinctive proclivities to be pursued in a changing social and natural environment. As Veblen 
(pp. 6-7) put it:  
The instinctive proclivities are essentially simple and look directly to the attainment of 
some concrete objective end; but in detail the ends so sought are many and diverse, and 
the ways and means by which they may be sought are similarly diverse and various, 
involving endless recourse to expedients, adaptations, and concessive adjustment 
between several proclivities … 
Instincts are „essentially simple‟ and directed to „some concrete objective end‟. Habits are the 
means by which the pursuit of these ends could be adapted in particular circumstances. In 
comparison to instinct, habit is a relatively flexible means of adapting to complexity, 
disturbance and unpredictable change. Instincts are honed and selected over thousands of 
years and do not reflect transitory circumstances. By contrast, habits are acquired through 
imitation and allow much more rapid learning, often related to novel circumstances. 
Veblen‟s line of argument suggests that humans faced diverse and changing problems in 
their evolution and this helped sophisticated mechanisms of habit formation to emerge. On 
more specific lines it could be argued that capacities for sophisticated habit formation and 
cultural growth emerged among humans to deal with a changing and unpredictable climatic 
and natural environment. Environmental change, particularly climatic change, is now 
emerging as a major explanation of the evolution of both intelligence and culture among 
humans (Potts 1996, Calvin 2002). Sophisticated human cultures first emerged in the strongly 
fluctuating Ice Age climates of the last few hundred thousand years. 
Richerson and Robert Boyd (2001, p. 449) explain that for cultural transmission to retain its 
importance, environmental change must be neither too fast nor too slow: „The largest 
advantage to culture comes in environments that are changing a lot on the time scale of tens of 
generations, but not to rapidly in any one generation.‟ 
Accordingly, the human capacity to form habits has evolved as a result of highly variable 
environmental and other conditions. The next (fairly obvious) question is why the same 
capacity to form sophisticated and adaptable habits is not found to the same degree among 
other species, who endured similar environmental variations. The answer is in terms of the 
relatively more sophisticated development of social structures among early humanoids. 
Individual humans had to deal with a relatively complex social as well as natural 
environment. They evolved the capacity to create and sustain relatively complex social 
structures, but at the same time they had to evolve the capacities of communication and 
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interpretation so that each individual could cope with his or her social circumstances. 
Habituation and sociality are linked together. 
Loss and reclamation in the social sciences 
In the early twentieth century, a number of social scientists followed Darwin by suggesting 
that reason depended on instinct and could not supplant it. The British dissident economist 
John Hobson (1914, p. 356) proposed „to break down the abruptness of the contrast between 
reason and instinct and to recognize in reason itself the subtlest play of the creative instinct.‟ 
Similarly, the American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1922, p. 30) emphasized that 
reason „does not supplant instinct‟ and „reason itself is an instinctive disposition … to 
compare, combine, and organize the activities of the mind.‟ 
A contrary and more dismissive view of the role of instinct emerged in sociology. Émile 
Durkheim (1984, pp. 262, 284) wrote in 1893: „It is indeed proven that intelligence and 
instinct always vary in inverse proportion to each other … the advance of consciousness is 
inversely proportional to that of the instinct.‟ Durkheim proved much more influential for 
twentieth century social science than Hobson or Cooley. As the social sciences broke from 
biology and Darwinism in the interwar period, this false antithesis between intelligence and 
instinct became commonplace in twentieth century social science.4 
But the breach with biology is slowly being repaired. Remarkably, with developments in 
modern psychology and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s, the views of Darwin, Veblen, 
Cooley and Hobson on instincts now seem remarkably modern. For instance, Howard 
Margolis (1987, p. 29) has pursued the hierarchy of instinct, habit and reason in the following 
terms: 
The output of the brain ... would then consist of some blending of instinct, habit, and 
judgment, all subject to errors and limitations, but on the whole sufficient to make the 
brain capable of survival in the environment in which it operates. There is a natural 
hierarchy in the three modes (instinct, habit, judgment). Habits must be built out of 
instincts, judgment must somehow derive from instinct and habits. 
The idea that that reason is in part a manifestation of instinct, and that instinct and reason are 
complements, has again found its time a century after James, Veblen and Cooley. Cosmides 
and Tooby (1994b, p. 330) wrote of „reasoning instincts‟ and Henry Plotkin (1994, p. 165) has 
explained that: 
Rationality and intelligence are extensions of instinct and can never be separated from it. 
The doctrine of separate determination is completely wrong. ... Instinct is the mother of 
intelligence. 
Instinct is not the antithesis of reason, but one of its preconditions. By freeing the conscious 
mind from many details, instincts and habits have an essential role. If we had to deliberate 
upon everything, our reasoning would be paralyzed by the weight of data. 
                                                 
4 The tide of opinion became so strong that many who claimed to be disciples of Veblen – notably Clarence 
Ayres (1921a, 1921b) – eschewed the concept of instinct for the social sciences. Such views of instinct remained 
so influential for so long that even Hayek (1988, pp. 16-17), who increasingly adopted ideas from biology, 
believed that a „gradual replacement of innate responses by learnt rules increasingly distinguished man from 
other animals‟ and typically regarded instincts as „atavistic‟, „ferocious‟ or „beastly‟. 
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Evolutionary versus mind-first explanations 
Much social science takes it for granted, or by definition, that „action‟ is motivated 
exclusively by reasons based on beliefs. This proposition is undermined by modern 
psychology as well as the evolutionary outlook offered by Darwinism. Experiments since the 
1970s show that conscious sensations are reported about half a second after neural events, and 
unconscious brain processes are discernable before any conscious decision to act (Libet 1985, 
2004, Libet et al. 1983, Wegner 2002, 2003, Wegner and Wheatley 1999, Haynes and Rees 
2005a, 2005b, Haynes et al. 2007). This evidence suggests that our dispositions are triggered 
before our actions are rationalized: we contrive reasons for actions already under way.5 
This evidence undermines explanations of human action wholly in the terms of reasons and 
beliefs. However, the „folk psychology‟ that beliefs are the source of intentions, choices and 
actions dominates social science. As critics elaborate, this ubiquitous „folk psychology‟ 
papers over a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These „mind-first‟ explanations 
of human behaviour are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, 
learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions.6 
Mind-first conceptions erect an unsustainable dualism or discontinuity between the mental 
and physical worlds, which is inconsistent with the fact of human evolution. 
Humans do act for reasons. But reasons and beliefs themselves are caused, and have to be 
explained. From a Darwinian perspective, reasoning itself is based on habits and instincts, and 
it cannot be sustained without them. Furthermore, consistent with the Darwinian doctrine of 
continuity, instincts and the capacities to form habits developed through a process of natural 
selection that extends way back into our pre-human past. 
The adoption of a habit-based perspective implies neither stasis nor lack of choice. As 
Dewey (1922) explained clearly, because of our engagement with diverse and changing 
contexts, we develop different habits of thought and action that sometimes come into conflict 
with one another. Such conflicts are opportunities for choice and change. For example, 
government health warnings and medical advice may change our habits of thought, from 
regarding alcohol as enjoyable to its perception as a dangerous drug. This new habit of 
thought comes into conflict with our habits and addictions, and our future behaviour becomes 
subject to a choice. Habit does not deny choice. On the contrary, the conflicting rigidities of 
different habits make choice inevitable. 
The biologist Ernst Mayr (1988, 1991) offers one of the clearest expositions of the 
importance of the Darwinian perspective for understanding human action. He fully 
acknowledges that human agents are purposeful, but places this in its evolutionary context. In 
contrast to „teleological‟ notion of an evolutionary goal for the system as a whole, individual 
agents may be goal-driven. He uses a different word to describe individual human purposes, 
and gives them a specific meaning. Mayr (1988, p. 45) defines „teleonomic‟ or „program-
based‟ behaviour as that which „owes its goal-directedness to the operation of a program’. 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, Libet (2004) argues that his experimental evidence is consistent with free will, which can 
intervene to block actions already foreshadowed in brain processes. Whether free will is consistent with the fact 
that our will is itself caused is an old philosophical controversy. To a large degree it depends on what precisely is 
meant by „free will‟ (Dennett 1984). 
6 See Bunge (1980); Stich (1983); P. M. Churchland (1984, 1989); P. S. Churchland (1986); Damasio (1994); 
Rosenberg (1995, 1998); Kilpinen (2000). 
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Such behaviour is governed by connected, rule-like dispositions, in some ways similar to a 
computer program. There remain enormous differences between a human mind and a 
computer, but they share this common, rule-driven or program-based characteristic. 
Viktor Vanberg (2002, 2004) elaborates Mayr‟s argument, and shows that it provides a 
powerful alternative to the idea – found in both Marxism and mainstream economics – that 
human agency can be explained essentially in terms of rational deliberation. The assumption 
that human behaviour is determined by emerging rational appraisal of interests (Marx), or a 
given preference function (neoclassical economics), lacks an explanation of the origin or 
operation of these rational capacities or preferences. The technology of rationality is assumed 
rather than explained. 
By contrast, the program-based approach relies on evolutionary theory to explain the origin 
of systems of rule-like dispositions, which are either inherited as instincts, or acquired as 
habits in a historically specific cultural setting. Generally, the human problem-solving 
capacity that rational choice theory attributes to „rationality‟, and Marxism to informed 
deliberation, is explained in the Darwinian terms by the knowledge of the world that is 
incorporated in rules or programs that guide behaviour. This knowledge has been accumulated 
through trial and error in the processes of human evolution and individual learning. 
Knowledge, in short, consists of adaptations that have emerged in an evolutionary process 
(Plotkin 1994). 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Darwinian thinking prompted a 
reconceptualisation of the relationship between mind and matter, which was expressed in the 
pragmatist philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and others.  
Pragmatism was eclipsed by the rise of logical positivism in the 1930s and was marginalized 
until the 1980s. Pragmatist philosophy is now enjoying a revival (Hands 2001, p. 214). One of 
its leading exponents, Hans Joas (1996, p. 158), succinctly summarized the pragmatist 
contribution in this area: 
The alternative to a teleological interpretation of action, with its inherent dependence on 
Cartesian dualisms, is to conceive of perception and cognition not as preceding action but 
rather as a phase of action by which action is directed and redirected in its situational 
contexts. According to this alternative view, goal-setting does not take place by an act of 
intellect prior to the actual action, but is instead the result of a reflection on aspirations 
and tendencies that are pre-reflexive and have already always been operative. In this act 
of reflection, we thematize aspirations which are normally at work without our being 
actively aware of them. But where exactly are these aspirations located? They are located 
in our bodies. It is the body‟s capabilities, habits and ways of relating to its environment 
which form the background to all conscious goal-setting, in other words, to our 
intentionality. Intentionality itself, then, consists in a self-reflective control which we 
exercise over our current behavior. 
Pragmatism offers a means of overcoming the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, which 
still pervades the social sciences. Intellect is not regarded as an independent and ungrounded 
causal power, but as an emergent and active property of already-engaged dispositions and 
unfolding actions. The reality and importance of human intentionality and creativity is 
reconciled with the Darwinian evolutionary legacy and philosophical materialism. 
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Concluding remarks 
To understand the changing fortunes of the concept of habit in the social sciences we must 
appreciate two profound shifts in the social sciences: first the adoption of the Parsons-Robbins 
consensus in the 1930s, and second how that consensus has become fractured today (Camic 
1986, Degler 1991, Hodgson 2004). Lionel Robbins (1932) made economics the „science of 
choice‟, assuming individuals with given preferences. Talcott Parsons (1937) saw sociology 
as the science of social structures, norms and values. Neither approach made much use of 
psychology. When psychology did enter the picture it was almost universally the newly-
established behaviourism of John B. Watson (1924) and others, which concentrated in 
positivist fashion on conditioning and overt behaviour, to the neglect of the unobservable 
mechanisms – innate or acquired – that lay behind appearances. 
When economics and sociology abandoned instinct-habit psychology they allowed a dualist 
ontology of the mental and material to re-enter their disciplines. Psychology was ignored, 
preferences were taken as given, or the mind was taken as a blank slate, to be written upon by 
experience. All these stances are inconsistent with a Darwinian perspective and the fact of 
gradual human evolution from species with lesser deliberative capacities. 
This perspective is a serious challenge for both economics and sociology. If we place 
human cognition in its evolutionary context, restore habit and instinct to their proper place in 
human decision-making, and acknowledge the empirical „Libet Gap‟ between unconscious 
mental activity and subsequent deliberation, then the supreme totem of choice in economics 
must be abandoned. Furthermore, in sociology and elsewhere, any primacy of belief and 
deliberation is similarly challenged. Choice is real, but it is caused.7 Understanding these 
causes has consequences for the type mental capacities that are assumed. 
Compared with economics, sociology made a much more radical break with biology in the 
in the interwar period, and is experiencing more difficulty than economics in accommodating 
evolutionary ideas. Consequently, sociology is in an even deeper theoretical crisis than 
economics. Its transcendence will require the critical rehabilitation of earlier traditions of 
sociology, including names such as Franklin Henry Giddings (1896), Lester Frank Ward 
(1903) and Charles Horton Cooley (1922), who engaged more closely with Darwinian ideas, 
in contrast to favoured classic thinkers such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons. 
Two diagrams illustrate the differences involved. Figure 1 illustrates the type of „mind first‟ 
or „beliefs first‟ model that dominates much of the social sciences. 
                                                 
7 By contrast, some economists see choice as an „uncaused cause‟ (Shackle 1976) or uphold a view of human 
agency as „free of external causes‟ (Minkler 2008, p. 21). For a critique of such claims of „uncaused causes‟ see 
Hodgson (2004, pp. 61-2, 87-9). 
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Figure 1: The ‘Beliefs First’ Model 
 
By contrast, figure 2 places human cognition in an evolutionary perspective, showing how 
instincts and habits underpin beliefs. In turn, in a population, cultural selection acts on habits 
and natural selection upon instincts.8 
 
 
Figure 2: A Darwinian Conception of Human Cognition and Action 
 
This discussion raises questions about the scope and boundaries of the existing disciplines 
in the social sciences that cannot be answered here (Hodgson 2008). Nevertheless, even if 
some boundaries between the disciplines are to be retained, despite their vagueness at the 
present time, the impact of Darwinian and evolutionary ideas cannot be ignored. It cannot 
simply be a question of a division of labour where the psychologists are asked to give 
information on individual preferences that is then plugged in as data into the economists‟ 
                                                 
8 Figure 2 neglects the important proposal by evolutionary psychologists Cosmides and Tooby (1994a, 1994b) 
that the brain is not an all-purpose calculator but segmented or „modularized‟. Incorporation of this insight would 
require significant further development and complication of the figure. 
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models. As the discussion here of Becker‟s work shows, a full appreciation of the 
evolutionary issues overturns mainstream conceptions of choice and habit. As Kenneth Arrow 
(1986, p. S386) noted some time ago, a theory of habit in economic models could „more 
powerful than standard theory and at least as capable of being tested.‟ 
Once habit is seen as the foundation of preferences or beliefs, we can develop an enriched 
understanding of the interaction between individuals and institutions, including of the causal 
mechanisms involved. Emergent institutions help to pattern individual behaviour. 
Consequently, individuals develop and reinforce habits consistent with that behaviour, upon 
which revised beliefs and preferences transpire (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004). These revised 
beliefs or preferences lead to further actions, which may affect institutions, and so on. This 
gives us two-way mechanisms of reconstitutive interaction, from individuals to institutions 
and back to individuals (Hodgson 2006a). 
The implications for social theory are profound, including a transcendence of the old debate 
between „bottom up‟ (methodological individualist) and „top down‟ (methodological 
collectivist) modes of explanation. In a fully-fledged evolutionary view, causal influences 
have to be acknowledged in both directions. In practice, despite the popularity of 
„methodological individualism‟ as a term, all viable explanations of social phenomena involve 
both individuals and social structures: there is no known exception (Arrow 1994, Hodgson 
2007a, 2007b). From an adequate evolutionary perspective, we have to understand how 
individuals are affected by social structures, as well as how structures are constituted by 
individuals. Habit is a crucial mechanism in the former case. 
Some defend the view that economists take preferences as given by suggesting a division of 
labour between economics and psychology. Others simply claim that the assumption is the 
mark of economics as a discipline. Although the simplifying assumptions of given preferences 
is legitimate in some cases, it should not be obligatory within economics in all circumstances 
(Knight 1924). Since the 1990s this view has returned to economics. Not only is psychology 
being widely embraced by economists (Rabin 1998), but several leading economists consider 
the endogeneity of preferences as a legitimate topic within the discipline (Bowles 1998, 2004, 
North 1994, Akerlof and Kranton 2005). Much work within evolutionary economics has 
already moved in the same direction. 
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